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INTRODUCTION 
In the capital market, investors who engage in the purchase of 
securities receive a plethora of protection, which better assists them 
in making sound investment decisions, both in the short-term and 
long-term future. Indeed, protection is abundant in the capital market, 
spanning from state legislation to comprehensive federal legislation, 
providing federal statutory affirmative duty requirements by companies 
to fully and fairly disclose financial information including but not 
limited to profitability conditions and health. Capital investors also 
have the available benefit of instituting federal claims against issuers 
of stock for fraudulent misrepresentations contrary to federal securities 
laws. These protections exist in many other regulatory sectors, such as 
campaign finance,1 product safety,2 energy regulation,3 environmental 
law,4 and health law.5 
However, in the employment and labor market, 6 affirmative 
information disclosure obligations and fraud protection (i.e. the 
availability of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentations) are 
' J.D., American University Washington College of Law, cum laude, 2014. B.A. International 
Business, University of South Florida, cum laude, 2009. I would like to thank my wife for her 
patience and support in writing this piece. I would also like to thank my mother and father for 
their love and inspiration. I would like to thank my grandfather, an author whose skill I hope one 
day to reach. Finally, a special thank you to Washington College of Law Professor Ezra Rosser for 
believing in this piece and providing me with guidance when needed. 
1 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2012). 
2 See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C § 2055 (2012); see also 
Publicly Available Consumer Product Safety Information Database, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION, http://www.saferproducts.gov (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) (providing a publicly 
searchable database where people can file reports including harms or risks of harm related to the 
use of consumer products or substances). 
3 See Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Automobiles, 16 C.F.R. §§ 259.1-259.2 
(2014) (mandating disclosure of estimated city and highway miles per gallon for automobiles); id. 
§ 305.11 (mandating disclosure of energy consumption and water usage for appliances); see also 
About Energy Star, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2014) (describing a joint program with the Environmental Protection Agency 
concerning labeling and environmental standards for products and buildings). 
4 See Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023 
(2012) (requiring disclosure of toxic and hazardous chemicals to communities and neighborhoods); 
see also Standard for Demolition and Renovation, 40 C.F.R. § 61.145 (2013) (mandating disclosure 
of asbestos-releasing demolition and renovation activities); id. § 156.10 (mandating disclosure of 
pesticide ingredients). 
5 See Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2014) (mandating disclosure of nutritional 
information for food products); id. § 1141.1 (requiring health warnings displays on cigarette 
packages and cigarette advertisements). 
6 Although labor law governs labor-management relations primarily in unionized workplaces, 
while employment law regulates non-unionized workplaces, this paper encompasses employees 
in both the labor and employment market; thus, for clarification purposes, this paper uses the 
term "employment and labor market." Also, this term is used interchangeably with "workplace" 
throughout, and "employment and labor law" is used interchangeably with "workplace law." 
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not yet available on a national level. Many justifications have been put 
forth for the absence of such obligations and protections for employees 
in the employment and labor market. For instance, much research exists 
on the economic costs of mandating federal regulation and many argue 
that current common law and state statutory remedies are adequate. 
Notwithstanding the various arguments in opposition to instituting 
federal disclosure and fraud protection in the workplace, this paper 
investigates and argues that both forms of regulation are necessary. 
Requiring employers to disclose pertinent information is vital to the 
wellbeing of their employees, and the necessity of holding employers 
liable for misrepresentations must exist in conjunction. There are many 
instances of employers misleading their employees, either because they 
failed to disclose material facts to their detriment or because employers 
made affirmatively fraudulent misrepresentations. For reasons set forth 
below, employees have a difficult time succeeding in lawsuits against 
their employers. 
Take for instance employers falsely inducing their employees to 
believe their jobs are safer than they actually are. This is an all too 
common occurrence. A vivid example is the case of Local 1330, United 
Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., involving the closure of two 
American steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio in the 1970s and 1980s.7 The 
holding in the case is rather simple: management retains management 
control of the company; a union has its role limited to negotiating the 
terms and conditions of employment; and the decision on how to run 
a company, including closing business due to profitability issues, is 
reserved to management. 8 The devastating consequences were not that 
simple, however. 
U.S. Steel Corp. was at an all-time low, facing economic struggle 
to stay afloat, while having to tackle with competition and outdated 
facilities and machinery.9 During this time, U.S. Steel Corp.'s two 
Youngstown plants had employed 3,500 employees.10 
After hearing rumors that the two steel plants would be closing, 
employees asked management about the future of the plants, including 
whether it was making enough profit and planned to stay operating 
in the long haul.11 Naturally, Youngstown steel plant employees were 
7 Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1264 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
8 Id. at 1282. 
9 Id. at 1265-66. 
10 Id. at 1272. 
11 Id. at 1270. 
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concerned about the security of their jobs. In response, "hotline" 
telephones were "placed strategically in these plants so that employees 
could hear prerecorded management policy statements."12 
Representations by management began with statements made by 
then president of U.S. Steel Corp. David Roderick: "[i]n response to 
many rumors, I want to tell you that there are no immediate plans to 
permanently shut down either the Ohio Works or McDonald Mills," 
"[t]he continued operation of these plants is absolutely dependent 
upon their being profit-makers, and "[i]n the months ahead, we will be 
calling for the full support of each and every one of you" because /1 [y] our 
cooperation and assistance is absolutely necessary if our facilities are to 
continue to operate."13 Company press releases depicted productivity 
improvements in the two Youngstown steel plants, some of them 
including references to a /1 complete turnaround" and the plants being 
once again "profitable."14 
Management made it a point to reiterate that U.S. Steel Corp.'s 
future was in the hands of its employees, challenging them to continue 
to be innovative and to produce quality products for the company's 
customers.15 After making a monthly profit for the year, management 
stated, again through the company's hotline, that the company's goals 
were indeed attainable.16 Management was so confident about this 
that they continued to make press releases, stating, inter alia, "[w]e11 
be doing business here for some time to come."17 Management told its 
employees it had attained its 1978 goal of "survival" and it was now 
time to transition into the goal of "revival."18 Also, in early November, 
another corporate official made similar assertions when he stated that 
"[w]e've said all along the Ohio Works has been profitable and there 
are no plans for a shutdown."19 
As a result of U.S. Steel Corp.'s representations, many employees 
forewent opportunities, for instance, to take other employment job 
offers, and they committed themselves to long-term expenses including 
the purchase of homes.20 One employee, considering whether to take 
employment elsewhere as his pension was close to vesting, was advised 
by his foreman to stay with U.S. Steel Corp. because he would have a 
12 Id. at 1270 n.3. 
13 Id. at 1270. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1271. 
16 Id. at 1272. 
17 Id. 
1s Id. 
19 Id. at 1273. 
20 Id. at 1276. 
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"secure future" there.21 Upon this reliance, the employee stayed with 
the company, purchased a car soon after, and then purchased a home 
some months later. 22 
However, the reality was that both Youngstown steel plants would 
soon be closing-and they did. On November 27, 1979 (approximately 
six to nine months later), the decision was made by the Board of 
Directors to shut down, the same day an employee had purchased 
a home and heard the news on his car radio on his way back from 
the bank.23 With their livelihoods and families now at stake, 3,500 
employees would soon be out of work. 24 
It is difficult to know for certain whether the corporate board really 
knew whether U.S. Steel Corp., along with its two Youngstown plants, 
would soon go out of business. Nevertheless, whether corporate 
representatives knew does not negate the recurring statements made, 
including one of the last announcements by Mr. Roderick: "[s]imply 
stated, we have no plans for shutting down our Youngstown operation,"25 
reiterating that only "massive expenditures to meet environmental 
requirements" could cause a plant closing, or, an "unproductive plant 
operation."26 Even though employee plaintiffs could not prove it, it is 
quite possible that U.S. Steel Corp. made misrepresentations by giving 
incomplete or false information. 
The laid off employees of the Youngstown plants sought remedies, 
making various arguments against U.S. Steel Corp. Their first claim 
sought an equitable contract remedy of promissory estoppel, attempting 
to estop U.S. Steel Corp. from denying there was an enforceable 
promise when it made the representations to its employees, which they 
ultimately relied upon to their detriment.27 The Sixth Circuit agreed 
that U.S. Steel Corp. engaged in a "major campaign to enlist employee 
participation in an all-out effort to make these two plants profitable in 
order to prevent their being closed" and that it was /1 equally obvious 
that the employees responded wholeheartedly."28 
21 Id. 
22 Id.at 1276-77. 
23 Id. at 1277. 
24 Id. at 1265. 
25 Id. at 1273. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1270. The doctrine of promissory estoppel recognizes the possibility of the formation 
of a contract by action or forbearance by the induced party, based upon a promise made by the 
inducing party under circumstances where the actions or forbearance of the induced party should 
have been reasonably expected to produce the detrimental results of the induced party which it 
produced. RESTATEMENT 1SECONDI OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1932). 
28 Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1277. 
12 THE NEED FOR FEDERAL DISCLOSURE AND 
FRAUD PROTECTION IN THE WoRKPLACE 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court's reasoning 
that none of the statements made by plant officers constituted a definite 
promise to continue operations of the plants if they did become 
profitable, and that, inter alia, the /1 condition precedent of the alleged 
contract and promise-profitability of the Youngstown facilities-
was never fulfilled." 29 Employee plaintiffs next asserted a community 
property claim, that based on reliance interests, property rights had 
arisen from the "long-established relation between the community 
of the 19th Congressional District and Plaintiffs," which required 
U.S. Steel Corp. to assist in the preservation of the institution of steel 
in Youngstown by making a cost determination of rehabilitating the 
community and workers, and ultimately restraining from leaving the 
community in a state of waste.30 Unfortunately, as the trial court would 
hold, there was no legal precedent for such a claim. 
The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the trial court's decisions, 
adding that the "formulation of public policy on the great issues 
involved in plant closings and removals is clearly the responsibility of 
the legislatures of the states or of the Congress of the United States."31 
After U.S. Steel Corp. pulled out of Youngstown, the consequences were 
devastating: the city lost approximately one third of its population and 
it continues to have one of the highest unemployment rates in the state. 
Local 1330 is just one example of recurring and debilitating effects of 
nondisclosure and employer fraud in the workplace.32 Is it infactfeasible 
to require employers to disclose information, while at the same time 
holding them liable for providing inaccurate or fraudulent disclosures? 
More specifically, should there be federal legislation that encompasses 
an affirmative information disclosure requirement and a cause of action 
29 Id. at 1277. Much of the debate in this claim rested on what constituted "profitability." In the 
end, the Sixth Circuit failed to adopt plaintiff employees' definition of "profitability," and using 
instead U.S. Steel Corp.'s definition, held there was actually non-profitability." Id. at 1279. 
30 Id. at 1280. 
31 Id. at 1282. 
32 Another example is Washington v. Aircap Industries, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 307, 310-11 (D.S.C. 
1994), where the company made the official decision to close its factory in May, but even after such 
decision was made, told its workers that the plant would remain open and continue operating 
through the summer of the same year. The plant closed only six weeks after the decision to close 
was made. Id. at 310-11. See also Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401, 1405 
(9th Cir. 1991), in which Sun Carriers bought Milne, an independent trucking company, and 
allegedly made speeches to Milne employees, showing them videos and promising job security, 
as well as asking them to stop looking for employment elsewhere. Several months later, Sun 
Carriers chose to close all Milne plants. Id. at 1405. Additionally, in Charter Township of Ypsilanti 
v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 558-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam), the city 
of Ypsilanti sued General Motors after the company made the decision to close a plant there. 
Based on implicit and explicit representations, Ypsilanti granted General Motors an array of tax 
abatements that would enable the company to "continue production and maintain continuous 
employment for [their] employees." Id. at 561. 
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for employees in order to remedy wrongful misrepresentations by 
their employers? This paper argues that it would be feasible. A uniform 
obligation to disclose accurate information can play a pivotal role in 
insuring that both current employees and prospective employees have 
the information they need to make sound decisions about their short-
term and long-term wellbeing. 
This paper uses federal securities laws to illustrate the 
comprehensiveness of federal disclosure requirements and fraud 
protection available to capital investors. It is important to note that 
corporate law and employment (or labor) law have rarely been studied 
together and it has been observed that the two fields are separate 
fields of legal scholarship and regulatory policy.33 Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that corporate lawyers do not delve into employment 
and labor law or vice versa, nor does it signify a lack of relevance to 
one another.34 For example, corporate law, which provides the legal 
structure and regulation over business entities, allows such entities to 
enter employment agreements with employees.35 Simultaneously, a 
corporation's actions in "establishing, conducting, and terminating" 
employment relationships are subject to employment and labor law.36 
Part I of this paper starts with an explanation of the origins 
and common law background of the law of fraud (or deceit) and 
nondisclosure. Part II then proceeds to argue that federal disclosure 
and fraud protection are not mutually exclusive forms of regulation 
and must be used in conjunction with one another. Part III examines 
the status quo in the capital market and in the employment and labor 
market with regard to disclosure requirements and federal fraud 
protection, including concerns Congress had when enacting federal 
legislation. Part IV attempts to reconcile congressional concerns in the 
capital and employment and labor market and argues that a disclosure 
mandate supplemented by fraud protection is also justified in the 
workplace. Part V proceeds to discuss the general importance of federal 
information disclosure and fraud protection. Part VI argues that the 
status quo in the employment and labor market is insufficient and 
supports this proposition by examining voluntary forms of disclosure, 
the possibility of market-self correction, state common and statutory 
law, and the individual employment rights law model. Part VII 
33 Steven Anderman, Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?, in THE FuTURE OF LABOUR 
LAw 126 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004); Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in 
THE FuTURE OF LABOUR LAw 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004). 
34 Richard Mitchell et al., Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections Between Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law, 23 Wrs. INT'L L.J. 417, 417 (2005). 
35 Id. at 417. 
36 Id. at 417. 
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analyzes some of the costs and benefits of a federal statutory response 
to disclosure and fraud protection in the employment and labor 
market. Part VIII outlines a recommended federal statute of disclosure 
and fraud protection by addressing its possible contours and scope, 
methods to reduce costs and anticipate unintended consequences, the 
possibility of an executive administrative agency to promulgate rules 
to aid in further interpreting the proposed federal statute, as well as 
possible liabilities and enforcement schemes that could be used. Part 
IX concludes with the proposition that a federal law is both possible 
and necessary. 
I. ORIGIN AND COMMON LAW BACKGROUND OF FRAUD AND 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
The law of torts pertaining to fraud (also known as the law of deceit), 
dates back to 1201.37 To be liable for fraudulent misrepresentation at 
common law, one must make a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention, or law with the purpose of persuading another to take action 
or to omit from taking an action in reliance upon the misrepresentation. 38 
If this occurs, the deceiver is liable to the other for his or her economic 
loss incurred.39 A misrepresentation in this context denotes words and/ 
or conduct that lead to an assertion that is not the truth.4° Furthermore, 
to be fraudulent, the misrepresentation must have some degree of 
scienter; specifically, the speaker must "know[] or believe[] that the 
matter is not as he represents it to be; does not have the confidence in 
the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or knows 
that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or 
implies."41 
Common law fraud protects against statements made about the 
future that is in the form of a prediction or promise where it may 
justifiably imply that the person making the representation "knows 
of nothing which will make the fulfillment of his prediction or 
promise impossible or improbable."42 Hence, an assertion that a used 
Macintosh Apple MacBook Pro 15 inch laptop computer will have a 
battery life of five hours when not plugged in is an implied assertion 
that the condition of the computer will enable it to do so. In this case, 
37 w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS§ 105, 727 n. 30 (5th ed. 1984). 
38 RESTATEMENT 1SECONDI OF TORTS§ 525 (1977). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at § 525 cmt. b. 
41 Id. at § 526. Thus, a seller believing his car to have engine problems, and who, upon inquiry by 
the purchaser, states that the car does not have engine problems and that it runs well, is liable for 
the deceit. 
42 Id. at § 525 cmt. £. 
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the misrepresentation will be actionable if the speaker of the assertion 
knows that the Mac computer has only ever run on two hours of battery 
life when not plugged in. 
A person can also be liable for silence or nondisclosure of facts. 43 
For instance, in a business transaction a party can be under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care by disclosing certain facts to the other party 
before the transaction is completed.44 This includes information that 
the other party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary relationship 
of trust and confidence between the one with the information and the 
other who needs it.45 This is because a person of trust has /1 an affirmative 
duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable care to 
avoid misleading his clients."46 
Liability for nondisclosure also includes partial or incomplete 
statements, because they are misleading or ambiguous as to lead to two 
interpretations, one true and one false.47 In this circumstance, it would 
be necessary to avoid misleading the recipient of the information. 
Another requirement of disclosure occurs when the person has "facts 
basic to the transaction."48 A "basic" fact means /1 a fact that is assumed 
by the parties as a basis for the transaction itself" which /1 goes to the . 
. . essence of the transaction, and is an important part of the substance 
of what is bargained for."49 For instance, A sells an automobile to B, 
without disclosing to B that the engine of the automobile is close to 
malfunctioning. This would be a basic fact that goes to the essence of 
the transaction between A and B and therefore A would have a duty to 
disclose. 
Additionally, one who conceals information may be liable in a 
transaction with another party who "intentionally prevents the other 
from acquiring material information."5° For instance, in order to 
conceal the fact that A's horse, which he is trying to sell to B, is a crib-
biter and wind-sucker, A hitches the horse up with its head raised so 
43 Id. at§ 551 (1977). 
44 Id. at§ 551(2). 
45 Id. at§ 551(2)(a). 
46 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). The duty to exercise 
reasonable care and disclose can also be seen in other contexts, such as relations between estate 
executor and beneficiary, Foreman v. Henry, 210 P. 1026, 1026-27 (Okla. 1922); principal and agent, 
McDonough v. Williams, 92 S.W. 783, 788 (Ark. 1905); bank and investing depositor, Brasher v. 
First Nat. Bank, 168 So. 42 (Ala. 1936); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 393 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1975); and 
majority and minority stockholders, Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). 
47 RESTATEMENT 1SECONDI OF TORTS§ 551(2)(b). 
48 Id. at§ 551(2)(e). 
49 Id. at§ 551(2)(e) cmt. j. 
so Id. at § 550. 
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that it cannot bite its crib and suck wind. B inspects the horse and does 
not discover the defects. Here, A would be liable to B for the intentional 
nondisclosure.51 Moreover, there is no duty to disclose all information 
in an arm's length relationship, but "a duty to speak may arise from 
partial disclosure, so that the speaker, although not under a duty to 
speak, has a duty to tell the whole truth if he does speak."52 There is no 
requirement of contractual privity in the affirmative misrepresentation 
case at common law.53 Thus, an actionable claim would arise for a 
material misrepresentation or material omission without the parties 
having had engaged in a formal or informal business transaction. 
II. MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY: MANDATED DISCLOSURE AND 
FRAUD PROTECTION 
Federal disclosure and fraud protection are not mutually exclusive 
forms of regulation. An employer cannot be obligated to disclose 
information to its employees without the added necessity of disclosing 
accurate information, i.e. without holding the employer liable for 
providing inaccurate information. One can be mandated to disclose, but 
it will not serve a purpose to people who need the information, unless 
the entity disclosing provides accurate information. An incentive is 
needed and creating liability will accomplish this task: holding entities 
and individuals liable either for not disclosing when disclosure is 
necessary to prevent inaccuracies, or, for affirmatively disclosing 
inaccurate information. As one commentator put it: "mandatory public 
disclosure would be meaningless if employers were not accountable 
for false or misleading representations."54 Thus, this paper examines 
both forms of regulation in conjunction with one another. 
III. THE STATUS Quo 
In order to understand the analytical framework of the federal 
legislative proposal that this paper seeks to make, it is important 
to explain the current state of affairs with regard to protection in 
the employment and labor market and the congressional concerns 
underpinning the enactment of various federal statutes, and compare 
that with the status quo in other markets, namely the capital market, 
which provide the type of protection that this paper proposes for the 
employment and labor market. 
51 Croyle v. Moses, 90 Pa. 250, 253-54 (1879). 
52 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS§ 108 (5th ed. 1984) 
53 Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE 
L.J. 715, 729 (1997). 
54 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 400 
(2011). 
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A. PROTECTION AND FOUNDATIONS IN THE CAPITAL MARKET 
1. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND FRAUD PROTECTION IN 
THE CAPITAL MARKET 
In the capital market, there is an array of federal statutory 
protection, including disclosure requirements requiring companies 
to make continuous disclosures throughout various periods of time. 
The Securities Act of 1933, sometimes called the "truth in securities" 
law (herein "Securities Act"), was enacted with the main purpose of 
"provid[ing] full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold 
in interstate commerce and foreign commerce and through the mails, 
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."55 
The Securities Act requires that investors have available financial 
information concerning publicly offered securities and aims to prohibit 
11 deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities."56 
Specifically, companies must file an effective registration statement 
pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission.57 The registration forms provide important 
facts to investors, including: a description of the company property and 
business; description of the respective security to be sold; information 
regarding management of the company; and financial statements 
of the company which are certified by accountants. 58 Although there 
are statutory and regulatory exceptions to a section 5 registration 
requirement,59 such exceptions are intended for investors who are 
55 Securities Act of 1933, H.R. 5480, 73rd Cong. Preamble (1933). 
56 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION, http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
57 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
58 Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION, http:// 
www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
59 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77d, also known as the "intrastate" exemption, which 
was designed for offerings by businesses incorporated and doing business in one state where 
securities are offered and sold to in-state residents and businesses for in-state financing needs. The 
reasoning behind such exemption is that state securities regulation provides sufficient protection 
for investors purchasing state securities on a more local scale than on a national scale. Moreover, 
it is worth noting that although certain statutory and regulatory exemptions free the issuing 
company from the Securities Act's registration requirements, generally, the prohibitions against 
fraud in the offer and sale of securities still apply. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j (2012), "It shall be unlawful for any person, ... by the use of any means or instrumentality 
... to effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with the purchase 
or sale, of any security other than a government security" (emphasis added). Another securities 
exemption is known as the "small or limited" exemption under section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 
which allows issuers to bypass section 5 registration requirements if no more than an aggregate 
amount issued is $1 million in a particular sale and not for the life of the corporation. See Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d. SEC Rules 504 and 505 provide further regulatory measures for 
particular types of sales under section 3(b). See Exemption for Limited Offerings and Sales of 
Securities not Exceeding $1,000,000, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014); Exemption for Limited Offers and 
Sales of Securities not Exceeding $5,000,000, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2014). The economic justification 
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generally able to fend for themselves without the full disclosure 
statements required by the Securities Act. A part of the registration 
statement includes a prospectus, another means for potential buyers 
of securities to understand the complexities and intricacies of the 
transaction they are likely to contract in. 60 
A section 5 registration statement requirement also includes 
informational requirements which consist of over thirty-two items 
regarding the issuing corporation and its finances, and provides 
a foundation for civil liability for releasing false or misleading 
information. 61 
After its initial enactment, the Securities Act received fierce 
opposition, particularly because compliance with disclosing would 
be expensive, tedious, and thus cause corporations to look at raising 
capital through alternative sources rather than making public stock 
offerings.62 In the end, however, a federal mandatory disclosure system 
was enacted. 63 
Another principal federal statute in the capital market requiring 
information disclosures is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (herein 
"Exchange Act"). 64 A company deemed "public" for purposes of the 
Exchange Act65 will be required to provide continuous disclosures: 
annually on Form 10-K,66 which is an annual report required by the 
behind such exemption is apparent: if fraud arises, the monetary impact will not be as great as 
compared to the transactional dollar amount in a national exchange market where the risk of 
impact may be higher. Additionally, under the "private placement" exemption, sales can only be 
made to sophisticated or "accredited" investors, including investors who have proper training in 
law or finance, experienced businessmen, accountants, and those who can fend for themselves 
and ask all the right questions. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d. SEC Rule 505 and 506 
provides further regulations by placing a limit on the number of accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.505; Exemption for Limited Offers and Sales without Regard to Dollar Amount of Offering, 
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014). 
60 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j, which prescribes what is required to be included in 
every prospectus used in securities trading. 
61 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
62 Joel Seligman, The SEC and the Future of Finance, 99 HARV. L. REv. 710, 710 (1986). 
63 Id. 
64 Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
65 "Companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500 
owners must file annual and other periodic reports." The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2014). A company is also deemed "public" if it has its stock listed on a 
national or regional securities exchange. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781. Thus, 
a company with stock listed under the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), or the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) 
will be deemed "public" and it will be unlawful for the issuer to "effect any transaction in any 
security ... unless a registration is effective." Id. 
66 Form 10-K, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formlOk. 
htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that gives, inter alia, 
a comprehensive overview of a company's business and financial 
performance; and, Form 10-Q, which must be filed for each of the first 
three fiscal quarters of the company's fiscal year.67 The form "includes 
unaudited financial statements and provides a continuing view of the 
company's financial position during the year."68 
Aside from federal disclosure requirements, capital investors, if 
successful, can hold entities liable for fraudulent misrepresentations. 
For instance, the Securities Act imposes civil liability on anyone who 
makes or causes to be made any misrepresentations of its registration 
statement, including untrue statements of fact or omissions of material 
fact.69 
Investors also receive protection against companies who induce 
investors to purchase its securities with fraudulent misrepresentations, 
under SEC Rule lOb-5,7° promulgated pursuant to section lO(b) of the 
Exchange Act.71 Indeed, it is considered the most prominent, most 
frequently invoked federal rule for addressing securities fraud. 72 It can 
apply in a range of circumstances, namely, when a company attempts 
to issue securities and in the process lies to the public in a private 
or public sale under the Securities Act, when an insider or company 
engages in insider trading,73 or when issuers attempt to engage in 
market manipulation by deliberately attempting to interfere with free 
economic competition.74 Moreover, a company and its representatives 
can violate federal securities laws by providing "false or misleadingly 
67 Form 10-Q, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formlOq. 
htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
6s Id. 
69 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77w. See also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, which 
imposes penalties for anyone found liable under § 77w or any other provisions of the Securities 
Act. Thus, investors who purchase company securities after the company has issued its registration 
statement that "contain[ s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ s] to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading" creates 
a cause of action. Id. 
70 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2014). 
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
72 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'! Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (noting that section lO(b) 
and Rule lOb-5 "may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws"). 
73 Although the term "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal conduct, "illegal insider 
trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other 
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about 
the security." See Insider Trading, U.S. SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec. 
gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
74 Other instances where liability under Rule lOb-5 may be created include: Ponzi schemes; theft 
or misappropriation of funds or securities; fraudulent or unregistered securities offerings; false 
or misleading statements about a company; and abusive naked short selling. See Enforcement 
Tips and Complaints, U.S. SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/complaint/ 
tipscomplaint.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
20 THE NEED FOR FEDERAL DISCLOSURE AND 
FRAUD PROTECTION IN THE WoRKPLACE 
incomplete information in some informal context such as a report, press 
release, or director's speech, even if the communication is voluntary."75 
2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND 
FRAUD PROTECTION IN THE CAPITAL MARKET 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the United States lived through one 
of the most severe economic crisis in its history. Business regulation 
and institutional measures were necessary and laissez-faire economic 
policies were no longer suitable.76 Although Congress enacted a number 
of federal statutes to regulate securities and prevent economic disasters 
like the Great Depression,77 the legislation that had the greatest impact 
on the capital market were the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.78 
The general purpose of the Securities Act was "to regulate the initial 
distribution of securities by issuers to public investors."79 The goal of 
the various registration requirements was to provide full disclosure 
and truthful information regarding the character and condition of the 
securities offered to the public community. 80 
It is important to note that before any federal legislation was enacted, 
state governments enacted their own securities legislation.81 These 
state laws were known as "blue sky" laws because state legislators 
believed that if they did not pass state securities legislation, financial 
75 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 727-28. For instance, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 
833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968), the defendant corporation distributed a misleading press release about 
a huge ore strike. The Second Circuit held that Rule lOb-5 "is violated whenever assertions are 
made ... in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of 
the financial media ... if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead 
irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior 
purposes." Id. 
76 Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the 
Securities Act of1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of1934, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 329, 329 (1988). 
77 See, e.g., the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which "pervasively regulates 
electric and gas holding companies and their subsidiaries in order to assure their compliance 
with the statutory standards of geographical integration and corporate simplification" (Lours 
Loss ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 37 (1988)); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 
which requires that bonds, notes, debentures, and similar securities offered for public sale, unless 
exempted by the Act, be issued under the respective indenture that meets Act requirements (H. 
BLOOMENTHAL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES LAw 2 (1966)); the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, which regulated companies engaged in "investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or 
trading in securities" and required their registration (H. BLOOMENTHAL, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON SECURITIES LAw 3 (1966)); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which regulates broker-
dealers engaged in advising people "with respect to securities" and requires them to register with 
the SEC (H. BLOOMENTHAL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES LAw 3 (1966)). 
78 Keller, supra note 76, at 329. 
79 Id. at 330-332. 
80 Id. 
81 MICHAELE. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 6 (1970). 
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pirates would sell people everything in the state but the blue sky.82 Blue 
sky laws were broken down into two categories: antifraud laws and 
licensing laws. 83 Antifraud laws gave statutory authority for designated 
officials to investigate suspected fraud, enjoin fraudulent activities, and 
institute criminal proceedings in some cases.84 However, such antifraud 
laws took effect only after there was sufficient evidence that fraud had 
either been or about to be committed in securities trading. 85 Licensing 
laws had the purpose of prohibiting sales until proper registration 
filing was made, and the state granted official authority to engage in 
the selling of securities.86 The kind of registration required by these 
blue sky laws consisted of making company disclosures of financial 
condition and history, which was ultimately regulated by appropriate 
officials of the state securities agency. 87 
However, blue sky laws were ineffective for various reasons: there 
was a gap in the required level of expertise needed to enforce blue sky 
laws, as the enforcement of these laws were delegated to "unspecialized 
attorneys" and would change whenever political administrations 
would change, making blue sky enforcement unsteady;88 state funding 
was insufficient to maintain the necessary manpower needed to enforce 
such laws through investigation and instituting both remedial and 
prosecutorial action;89 many states were lenient in their enforcement 
of securities regulation in order to attract outside industry;90 and, 
promoters and dealers being investigated and prosecuted would offer 
refunds to prosecution witnesses who would many times accept the 
offers, causing the case to fail for insufficient evidence and ultimately 
interfering with effective enforcement of blue sky laws.91 
Additionally, circulars used prior to 1933, which were used 
to estimate the worth of a security proved to be ineffective, as they 
included "very little information as to the use of the proceeds, a rather 
brief description of the securities themselves, and very few if any 
material facts relating to the business of the issuer."92 And, fraudulent 
82 Id. at 5, n. 1. 
83 John E. Tracy, The New Federal Securities Act, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1117, 1118-19 (1933). 
84 Id. at 1119. 
85 Keller, supra note 76, at 331. 
86 Id. 
87 Tracy, supra note 83, at 1117-1118 
88 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 46 (1982). 
89 Id. 
9° Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the H. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 
73d Cong., 99-100 (1933) (Dept. of Commerce: A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the 
Proposed Federal Securities Act). 
91 Id. 
92 Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 
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practices were rampant.93 The general belief among legislators was that 
a great number of securities underwriters and dealers had not been 
operating in a fair and honest manner.94 It soon became clear that the 
ineffectiveness of blue sky legislation, together with a lack of state law 
uniformity in dealing with securities fraud called for an increased 
demand for federal legislation. The time for a federal response had 
come. 
Although it was clear that blue sky legislation had various setbacks 
and a federal response was necessary, the advent of federal securities 
law would not come until soon after the stock market crash. After 
many failed bills introduced to Congress and after a fierce debate 
regarding the constitutionality of federal securities regulation,95 U.S. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt made the commitment to enact federal 
legislation that would provide for national supervision of "traffic in 
investment securities in interstate commerce."96 The key goal would 
be to require issuers to provide full disclosure of information to the 
potential buyer, to have "full publicity and information, and that no 
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed 
from the buying public."97 Indeed, "publicity is justly commended as 
a remedy for social and industrial diseases[,] [s]unlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman[;] 
[t]he potent force of publicity must ... be utilized in many ways as a 
continuous remedial measure."98 On May 27, 1933, the Securities Act 
became federal law. 
The new law would help fill the gaps of blue sky legislation by 
implementing comprehensive prov1s1ons, including disclosure 
requirements and antifraud mechanisms. With regard to antifraud 
mechanisms, Congress recognized that allowing private parties to 
bring federal civil claims for wrongful conduct committed by securities 
issuers would enable the recovery of economic loss incurred,99 as well as 
play an important role in assuring compliance and deterrence.100 With 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 94 (1959). 
93 Id. 
94 H.R. REP. No. 85, pt. 2, at 2 (1933). 
95 See, e.g., Burgess, The Twilight Zone Between the Police Power and the Commerce Clause, 15 low AL. 
REv. 162, 162 (1930); Comment, Constitutional Law-Power to Enact Federal Securities Act of1933, 32 
MICH. L. REv. 811, 811 (1934). 
96 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to Congress (March 1933), reprinted in M. PARRINO, 
TRUST IN SECURITIES: AN INTRODUCTORY GumE TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 23 (1968). 
97 Id. at 24. 
98 See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (R. Abrams ed. 1967), in which Brandeis expressed 
President Roosevelt's regulatory philosophy. 
99 S. REP. No. 73-792, (1934). 
lOO H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: A CONCISE AND COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF 
AMERICAN SECURITIES LAW 64 (1977). 
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regard to the newly required disclosure provisions, much debate came 
from the fact that the Securities Act did not provide more protection by 
going further and taking increased corrective action.101 
The drafters of the Securities Act were primarily concerned with 
providing /1 adequate information to potential purchasers and holding 
those filing the registration statement liable for any misstatements 
or omissions."102 They were also well aware that common law forms 
of recovery for deceit or fraud were severely limited and presented 
obstacles.103 At common law, there was great variation in the definition 
of the scienter requirement, "particularly in admitting negligence as a 
sufficient substitute," increased confusion and became misleading.104 
Also, there were jurisdictional impediments in obtaining jurisdiction 
of the perpetrators and varying common law elements in fraud, further 
making the case for providing a uniform source of protection for 
persons defrauded in the capital market.105 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted to aid in the 
shortcoming of the Securities Act of 1933 and to enact an independent 
administrative agency that would oversee and enforce federal securities 
laws, including promulgating rules pursuant to the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act.106 Enactment of the Exchange Act was particularly 
intended to curb abuses in speculation and market manipulation.107 
In fact, Congress was concerned about the use of manipulative 
devices, manipulative pricing, and the regulation of broker and dealer 
activities.108 
However, Congress also wanted to make sure that issuers of stock 
provided continuing information to investors, notwithstanding the 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. Recognizing the dangers 
of having unlisted securities float in national, regional, and over-
101 Martin Nussbaum, Wall Street: From the Robber Barons to Regulation by the SEC in 95 Years, 191 
N.Y.L.J. 48, 48 (Jan. 30, 1984). 
102 Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 
627, 649 (1963). 
103 Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 235 (1933). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 238-39. 
106 See supra note 71; see Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.lOb-5 (2014) (noting SEC Rule lOb-5 provides a cause of action, whether by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or by private parties, making it unlawful for any person: to use any device 
or scheme to defraud; to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit any statement of 
a material fact; or to engage in any act that is fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security). 
107 John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MrCH. L. 
REV. 1025, 1027 (1934). 
108 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78k (2012). 
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the-counter exchange markets with high amounts of capital at stake, 
the Exchange Act's disclosure requirements made it a necessity for 
qualified securities to be registered and make continuous information 
disclosures.109 
Congress was also concerned with the dangers of insider trading 
on the part of corporate officers and directors who would use inside 
and confidential information to put themselves at a market advantage, 
thus abusing and betraying fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.110 
Congressman Lea correctly noted: "We have had the ugly picture of 
corporation officials juggling with the stocks of their own companies, 
preying on their own stockholders through inside information they 
obtained as trustees of the trust they violated."111 
The importance of federal protection in the capital marketplace is 
evident; as one commentator puts it: /1 an increase in the quantity, and 
an improvement in the quality of information available to investors will 
facilitate intelligent investment decisions and improve the efficiency 
of securities markets in pricing securities and in allocating financial 
capital to real capital."112 
B. PROTECTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MARKET 
No general applicable federal statute exists in the workplace 
against fraudulent misrepresentations committed by employers. 
And, mandatory disclosure has been an unexplored concept in the 
employment and labor field, garnering little attention from scholars or 
as a matter of public policy.113 Yet, like capital investors, employees in 
the workplace need two essential things: information and accuracy in 
the information given. Without it, employees, like investors, are unable 
to make intelligible decisions with respect to their livelihoods; namely, 
whether it is in their best interests to stay in the company or find 
employment elsewhere. More importantly, employees are likely to be 
impacted more in the future than capital investors, as employees must 
take into their pension, benefits, promotion opportunities, employment 
agreements, grievance procedures, salary, and others. 
109 TRACY & MAcCHESNEY, supra note 107, at 1025, 1049-1050. 
110 STOCK ExcHANGE PRACTICES: REPORT OF SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING AND CuRRENCY, S. REP. No. 
73-1455, at 55 (1934). 
111 78 Cong. Rec. 7861, 7862 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Lea). 
112 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 730. See also Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723, 735-36 (1989). 
113 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 
U. PA. L. REv. 613, 626 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First 
Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 653, 655-61 (1993). 
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There are laws that protect employees. For instance, the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act requires 
employers with 100 or more full-time employees to provide notification 
of plant closings and mass layoffs involving 50 or more workers at a 
single worksite.114 Notice of 60 days in advance must be given to workers, 
unions, and affected state agencies and authorizes the U.S. Department 
of Labor to promulgate regulations clarifying its applicability.115 What 
this federal statute does not do, however, is provide employees with 
protection for reliance on misrepresentations made by employers, nor 
does it provide employees with other forms of pertinent information, 
including information regarding management discussions or financial 
status and company health, which may be vital when only 60 days 
notice is given.116 
Employees can also take advantage of information pertaining 
to health and benefit plans under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).117 Employers, mainly labor unions, 
are required to file, inter alia, financial information under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).118 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)119 requires 
employers to disclose to its employees hazards and workplace risks to 
which they are exposed. 
To the extent employers engage in plant closings in a unionized 
context, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) requires employers to 
114 MARION G. CRAIN, WORK LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 287 (2d ed. 2010). See also Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2012). 
115 MARION G. CRAIN, WORK LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 287 (2d ed. 2010). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2101-2109. 
116 For instance, when disclosing pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 10-K annual 
disclosures that must be made must also include Management Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A). Information disclosed pertains to a 
company's financial condition, changes in financial condition, and results of operations relating 
to liquidity and capital resources. Congress realized that investors were less interested in 
past events and more interested in future predictions; hence, by requiring such disclosures, it 
now gave investors the opportunity to look at a company though the eyes of management by 
providing short and long-term analysis of the business of the company. See Commission Statement 
about Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8056.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014). 
117 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). 
118 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2012). 
119 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012). Under OSHA, 
employers must disclose or provide access to its employees Material Safety Data Sheets, which 
contain important information about health hazards associated with chemicals in the workplace. 
See id. OSHA federal regulations also include the Records Access Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020 
(2013), which requires employers to provide their employees with access to records containing 
historical medical and exposure reports of other employees who have been previously exposed to 
harmful chemical agents. 
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engage in effects bargaining with its employees whereby the employer 
must discuss and disclose to its employees the effects of the business 
closing.120 A business closing, including for example, cancelling a 
business contract or relocating to another jurisdiction, based on cost 
factors other than labor, including management decisions is lawful 
and therefore not considered an unfair labor practice, so long as the 
employer engages in effects bargaining with the union.121 It is important 
to note that an employer has such an obligation only after it has 
implemented its decision to close shop, not before. Thus, although 
employees will receive information regarding the implications of the 
employer's management decision, it comes at a time least convenient 
to employees. 
Alternatively, a business that makes the ultimate decision to shut 
down either entirely or partially by, e.g., subcontracting some of its work 
and based on factors including labor cost may also be lawful so long as 
the employer engages in decisions bargaining with the union representing 
the employees.122 Here, the employer must engage in bargaining 
discussions with the union before the employer has implemented any 
final decision. Decisions bargaining refers to the process by which an 
employer and union attempt to make a concession as to the plans the 
employer is to take, e.g. cutting labor costs and decreasing the labor 
force. 123 Hence, the quality and quantity of information that employees 
receive in the union context is dependent, to a great degree, upon the 
reasons for an employer's decision to close its business. 
Also, in the union context an employer must make certain 
disclosures to a petitioning union. Called the Excelsior rule, an 
employer must produce to the union, without any initial union 
request, the names and addresses of employees in the unit within seven 
days of the approval of an election agreement.124 The purpose of the 
requirement is to enable a union to distribute communications to the 
employees at their homes.125 Although the Excelsior rule seeks to create 
increased information disclosure, unions face barriers to speaking to its 
employees, as employers often require unions to speak to its employees 
outside the workplace and outside working hours.126 Unions also face 
120 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
121 First Nat'! Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 666 (1981); see also National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
122 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 203 (1964); see also National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
123 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 379 U.S. at 203. 
124 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966). 
12s Id. 
126 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REv. 1, 23 (2008). 
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barriers from employers in public places. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the 
Supreme Court held that employers could prohibit "all nonemployee 
solicitation and distribution, including union solicitation, on its retail 
parking lot."127 
As can be seen, employers already produce and report an abundance 
of information to the government that is of interest to employees and 
the general public. However, much of this information is submitted 
under an assurance of nondisclosure and is available to the public only 
in piecemeal form, or not at all.128 Moreover, no available law provides 
for a general information disclosure requirement supplemented by a 
general remedy for disclosing inaccurate information. 
IV. RECONCILING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS IN THE CAPITAL 
MARKET AND THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MARKET 
This section attempts to reconcile the concerns Congress had in 
enacting federal securities statutes, namely, the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act, with the absence of similar federal protections in the 
employment and labor market and makes the argument that because 
both markets share similar concerns, disclosure and fraud protection 
provisions are also justified in the workplace. 
Like blue sky laws, which proved to be insufficient, in the 
employment and labor market states must also expend budget 
resources to thoroughly investigate and enforce existing disclosure and 
antifraud laws. However, for states that do no yet have such legislation, 
it would require adequate investment in state legislation. And states 
who ultimately determine the investment cost to be too high will forgo 
implementing the legislation altogether. As President Roosevelt noted, 
publicity is indeed a remedy for social and industrial diseases and 
it must be used as a /1 continuous remedial measure."129 Similarly, a 
federal mandate could aid in the recovery of economic losses incurred 
by employees and serve as a deterrent against employers in an all too 
common problem. 
Just as Congress was concerned with the pitfalls and stringent 
requirements of common law notions of fraud, employees in the 
employment and labor market would be at an even greater disadvantage, 
as plaintiffs alleging common law fraud claims against their employers, 
particularly with respect to job security, present the most direct clash 
127 See id. See also Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 529, 541 (1992). 
128 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 396 
(2011). 
129 See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (R. Abrams ed. 1967). 
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with the employment at will doctrine, and thus are less likely to be 
successful.130 Jurisdictional barriers also present problems for employees 
who want to make fraud claims against employers found out of state. 
Recognizing the high cost of litigation and that /1 all but middle and 
upper income employees are largely foreclosed from any access to a 
remedy for wrongful dismissal[s],"131 the complexity of jurisdictional 
requirements would curtail employee's ability to summon employers 
to respond to allegations of fraud. 
As the capital market must deal with the effects of insider trading, 
employees in the workplace are vulnerable to corporate representatives 
hiding information and using it to their advantage.132 
The workplace would greatly benefit from an improvement in the 
quantity and quality of information available to employees by enabling 
them to have access to information that is vital to making important 
investment decisions with respect to their livelihoods. Knowing where 
employees should invest their time and skills can help improve the 
overall efficiency of the employment and labor market, as talented 
workers will look for employers who offer generous benefits, practices, 
and policies, while incentivizing employers who are unable to attract 
good talent to do a better job in what they offer. 
v. THE GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
AND FRAUD PROTECTION 
Disclosure is about providing people with information to help 
them make better decisions.133 Regardless of the market, disclosure 
is important because it can serve as a means to promote better 
compliance by making information regarding noncompliance more 
readily available and thus enforcement more likely.134 Currently, much 
of the information that firms report publicly goes into government 
databases, which is frequently stored in a confidential manner, and 
firm-specific information is often unavailable to the general public even 
130 Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy Intentional 
Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WrLLAMETTE L. REv. 233, 240-49 (2005). 
131 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 274 (2002) (citing Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for 
Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1992)). 
132 See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am., 631 F.2d at 1264 (arguing that corporate 
representatives arguably concealed information in order to retain the employees and keep them 
from leaving to other more prosperous employment opportunities). 
133 Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 338-39 (2013). 
134 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 373-74 
(2011). 
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under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).135 In the workplace, this 
is problematic because employers all too often rely on employees to 
comply with employer mandates and many U.S. employment laws 
are enforced primarily through private litigation.136 Thus, because 
employees face adverse employment actions including discipline and 
termination for not abiding by employer mandates, disclosure could 
help prospective and current employees understand what is required 
of them. 
Information disclosure can also lead to better-informed actors. 
Having information can facilitate self-learning or self-referential fact-
finding.137 For instance, a firm that does not know it is engaging in 
malicious or harmful behavior is less likely to take steps to remedy that 
behavior.138 Information can clarify expectations between the sender 
and recipient of the information, which can reduce the possibility of an 
actor taking advantage of its recipient audience.139 
Disclosure regulation can empower corporate leaders to take charge 
and improve company performance by taking a more personal interest 
in assuring that the company is introducing more effective systems 
and processes.14° For instance, by providing information about firm 
behavior to the public, including private watchdogs, it can alter not 
only the balance of power between corporations and the watchdogs but 
alter the dynamic of the negotiations as well.141 Information disclosure 
may influence sales or increase the possibility of increased government 
regulation, which may deter employers from committing unlawful 
practices, including engaging in misrepresentations. 
Finally, persons who may be interested in learning about a firm's 
profile and internal processes such as job security and termination 
rates may find it difficult to obtain such information.142 Prospective 
employees will certainly not want to ask about it for fear they may be 
perceived as weak employees.143 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 





142 See PAuL C. WEILER, GovERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 
74 (1990); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment 
at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 27 (1993) ("Young job entrants cannot easily assess an employer's 
reputation for how it handles senior workers"). 
143 See PAuL C. WEILER, GovERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 
74. 
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In the workplace, fraud tends to create an interstate effect, 144 where 
misrepresentations have induced employees to incur costs and move 
across state lines.145 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
uniformity in labor agreements and collective bargaining is necessary 
because of the "possibility that individual contract terms might have 
different meanings under state and federal law" and such differences 
11 would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation 
and administration of collective agreements."146 
Fraud protection is particularly important in the employment and 
labor market because unlike financial capital, human capital is far 
less fluid. 147 "Investors are protected by the virtually infinite number 
of investment substitutes."148 If an investor is not satisfied with the 
performance or output of a particular investment in a company, she 
can look for another investment or simply sell it.149 If a company has 
misled potential investors with regard to capital gains, those investors 
can generally find substitute investment vehicles in short order.150 Thus, 
the investor will move on from a defrauding firm to a more truthful 
firm in a relatively quick manner. 
There are fewer substitutes that exist in the employment and labor 
market.151 For instance, being unemployed is a less efficient substitute 
for a worker who loses his job than placing money in the bank is for 
an investor who must sell her stock in the company.152 Additionally, 
because of the difficulties of workers relocating, the exit option for 
workers is much costlier than it is for capital investors, where they 
can leave the capital market completely and at little cost.153 Moreover, 
144 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 7 48. 
145 See, e.g., Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 639 (Cal. 1996). In this case, the state Supreme Court 
held that a former employee stated a cause of action for fraudulent inducement of employment 
contract when he alleged that his employer "intentionally represented to him he would be 
employed" as long as he performed his job, that he would receive significant increases in salary, 
and that the employer was strong financially. Alleging that "the representations were false, the 
employee relied on them when he left secure employment to accept a job in another state, severed 
his connections with that state's employment market, moved his family, and purchased a home 
upon relocating." Id. 
146 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (quoting Pennsylvania R.R. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)). 
147 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 749. 
148 Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 
51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1061, 1065 (1984). 
149 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 749. 
1so Id. 
151 Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 
51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1061, 1066. 
152 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 749. 
153 Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate 
Law, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1061, 1066. The vivid comparison is to think of a steel plant worker from 
Youngstown attempting to move out of town to find work on the one hand, and a bag of money 
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the longer employees stay at a particular company, the higher their 
cost because of the more firm-specific skills they develop; thus they 
become more dependent on the firm's continued employment, as they 
will be more constrained.154 To the extent fraud is concerned, long-term 
employees will be greatly impacted.155 
Fraud protection can help employees verify at the pre-hiring 
stage whether an employer's information is honest. Because at-will 
employment is the prevalent norm in the employment and labor market, 
employees have no redress for termination and cannot insure against 
it.156 Accurate information about the "expected payoff" is imperative to 
determine whether and when to seek employment elsewhere.157 Thus, 
concealing a firm's decline and making false representations of its 
profits impacts employees' ability to decide whether to quit, as fraud 
11 credibly" conveys to employees that the firm is doing better than it 
actually is.158 
The implications of fraud applies equally to suppliers, vendors, and 
customers who make firm-specific investments or operate in markets 
where changing contractual partners is costly because most have open-
term contracts with their firms; hence, they are particularly sensitive 
to specific information that makes termination more likely, such as 
declining firm profits and risk that the firm will engage in mass layoffs 
and decrease firm production.159 
Fraud also affects rivals in various ways. Within the capital market, 
federal securities laws require firms to make continuous disclosures 
with regard to profits, cost of sales, market share, and the like. This 
information is not only of use to capital investors but to competitors 
as well who use the disclosures to assess which business strategies are 
optimal and what the market wants in a given period.160 Other firms' 
financial disclosures are /1 excellent source document[ s ]" that can help 
mitigate ambiguities about industry-level costs and demand, as well 
as help firms in the same industry make both effective and efficient 
long-term decisions.161 Overall, then, costs are reduced, which avoids 
being moved across state lines. 
154 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 7 49-50. 
155 Id. at 750. 
156 Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1887, 1920 (2013). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1921. 
159 Id. at 1925. 
160 Id. at 1929. 
161 Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements, 47 J. AccT. 
RES. 679, 680-81 (2009) (citing Phillip Moon & Ken Bates, Core Analysis in Strategic Performance 
Appraisal, 4 MGMT. AccT. REs. 139, 140 (1993)). 
32 THE NEED FOR FEDERAL DISCLOSURE AND 
FRAUD PROTECTION IN THE WoRKPLACE 
the need for pricier alternatives such as industrial espionage, and 
reliability is increased, as the disclosures are certified pursuant to 
federal securities laws.162 
In the employment and labor market, rival firms would also benefit 
from accurate disclosures. For instance, a firm's anti-discrimination 
policies are designed to provide guidance to employees in the workplace 
by outlining procedures and processes to take when an employee has 
been the victim of prohibited conduct such as sexual harassment or 
retaliation. Often, however, employers fail to adopt comprehensive 
policies and are left investing in lawyers to defend employee lawsuits 
that could have been avoided. Having accurate information available 
from more model firms could aid struggling firms to improve their 
policies by incorporating the /1 source documents" into their own policy 
structure. If the disclosed information appears to reward a firm with 
fewer lawsuits, other rivals will use the information to their advantage. 
Alternatively, with the absence of fraud protection, reliance would 
decrease and rivals would think twice before using a firm's source 
documents, as the incentive for providing accurate information would 
dissipate. 
Fraud is also costly to the government and communities. Fraud 
distorts government policy, reduces the tax base, creates unemployment, 
and harms communities.163 As former Federal Communications 
Commission Chairman Michael K. Powell notes, the federal government 
often bases policy decisions on required disclosures /1 to set regulatory 
fees, determine interstate access charges for telecommunications, set 
rates for unbundled services, evaluate whether the division of federal-
state jurisdiction is proper, and perform many other activities."164 
When fraud results in human capital loss because of failing firms or 
declining profits, "all levels of government suffer," particularly "from 
reduced tax revenues and increased demand for social spending."165 
The failure of a large firm affects the community, with increasing 
unemployment rates and business prospects, as people are forced to 
leave the affected region to look for better opportunities elsewhere. 
Illustrative is the Enron scandal. Enron declared bankruptcy, while 
other local companies in the area reported fraudulent activities, leaving 
Houston, an otherwise thriving and booming city, in a deeper and longer 
162 Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1887, 1929-30 (2013). 
163 Id. at 1937. 
164 Id. (citing See J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse 
of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 236 (2003) ). 
165 Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1887, 1937-38 (2013). 
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recession than the National recession.166 Houston's unemployment rate 
is generally lower than the national average.167 From1999 to 2006, crude 
oil prices tripled, so the city should have flourished; instead, however, 
the city's unemployment rate increased in 2002 and "remained between 
0.5 and 1 percent above the national average until late 2006."168 
VI. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE STATUS Quo IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOR MARKET 
A. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IS INADEQUATE 
One of the major pitfalls and critiques of disclosure mandates 
is that too much information is already being poured over and thus 
requiring disclosure will only produce "wasteful and unnecessary" 
use of resources.169 Therefore, it is better to rely on voluntary forms of 
disclosure to provide information to intended audiences. 
One answer is that firms will keep a tight grip on a great amount 
of information about the terms and conditions of employment and if 
left to their own devices may likely hide information that is not to their 
advantage.170 However, whether information is good or bad is irrelevant 
to an effective disclosure mandate, as recipients would benefit from 
both forms of information. 
We can attempt to fill the information gap with alternative responses 
to a federal statute, such as the use of intermediaries and interviews 
and insider discussions. However, they do not cure the barriers of 
securing the kind of information that employees need: objective and 
standardized that includes not only the good information.171 
Intermediaries. In theory, private intermediaries could help 
provide some objectively verifiable information. Examples of 
intermediaries include those that compile and gather information 
about firm practices for purposes of creating ratings and rankings.172 
The National Association for Law Placement (NALP) is an example. 
166 Id. (citing GREATER Haus. P'smr, THE ECONOMY AT A GLANCE: HousTON 1 (2011), available at 
http://dismbr04.lonestar.edu/tomball/ documents/NovemberEconomyataGlance. pdf (examining 
Houston's recession). 
167 GREATER Haus. P'smr, THE ECONOMY AT A GLANCE: HousTON 1 (2011). 
168 See Economic Development: Workforce, GREATER Haus. P'smr, http://www.houston.org/business/ 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
169 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics 
and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. Pm'y 199, 221-23 (2005). 
17° Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 379 
(2011). 
171 Id. at 384. 
172 Id. 
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Other intermediaries may include those that report information 
regarding company commitments and policies including demographic 
makeup and sexual orientation for organizations who seek to attain 
a reputation for diversity. For example, the Human Rights Campaign 
(HRC) rates companies for their policies regarding equal treatment of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employees.173 
All these examples are largely dependent on voluntary reporting 
by the firms themselves. The particular firms that choose to disclose 
certain information do so primarily for the purpose of demonstrating 
their positive performances and thus to help them be leaders in their 
respective industries. Firms who are not doing well or do not have 
adequate practices and policies will be less inclined to report, as 
they are unlikely to report disadvantageous information. Moreover, 
companies that voluntarily report are not really subject to any sanctions 
for providing inaccurate information.174 For instance, many "Best 
Companies" ratings appear in intermediary publications that rely 
primarily on advertising revenues from the self-reporting companies 
themselves.175 
There are other intermediaries that rely on voluntary reporting 
using information disclosed from firm employees and applicants. 
Internet sites such as Vault.com176 and Glassdor.com177 allow employees 
and applicants, mostly in an anonymous manner, to post information 
about their jobs, their employers, and the like. However, much of 
this information is umeliable because there is no accountability, the 
information is provided in an anonymous basis, and there is a fair 
amount of bias that is attached to the information, as the posts are 
based on individual experiences with a firm or prospective firm. Also, 
these types of intermediaries are limited to large organizations; there is 
scarce information available on either Vault.com or Glassdoor.com for 
smaller firms.178 
Interviews and insider discussions. If employees or prospective 
employees cannot get the information through intermediaries, perhaps 
they may get it by just asking their employer and avoid the need for 
mandated disclosure. However, workers care about the quality of their 
jobs, which in turn affects the type of questions likely to be asked to a 
173 Id. at 385. See also Corporate Equality Index, HuMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/ 
campaigns/corporate-equality-index (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
174 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 385. 
17s Id. 
176 VAULT, http://www.vault.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
177 GLASSDOOR.COM, http://www.glassdoor.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
178 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 386. 
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finn. 179 Topics may involve issues about job security, fairness, training, 
and the like, and asking about such matters may get in the way of being 
favorably perceived.180 
Employees can try to obtain information once they are employed. 
They can speak to other employees and get "the scoop" of the current 
state of affairs in the workplace. Employees can ask management 
and employees who have been with the employer longer to provide 
relevant information. Nevertheless, insider discussions may prove 
to be inaccurate or lacking, especially by management who may be 
selective in the information provided. For instance, management will 
not disclose the firm's current struggle with phase operations for fear 
of influencing employees to look for employment elsewhere. Even if a 
firm were to provide such information, employees may have a difficult 
time proving that it engaged in fraudulent misrepresentations.181 
Lastly, fraud begets fraud. 182 When a firm releases a misrepresented 
statement, its voluntary disclosures and observable actions must 
be consistent with the false statement, otherwise, the fraud will be 
discovered.183 
B. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MARKET-SELF CORRECTION 
Government fraud regulation may be unnecessary because the 
market may self-correct by providing its own forms of sanctions 
or incentives in the market. This theory is based on the insight that 
firms cannot lie about their services or products without incurring any 
costs.184 
However, employers of low performance may simply mimic the 
disclosure of certain ascertainable facts without being held accountable 
for any misrepresentations of untrue facts, thus frustrating the goal of 
verification and accuracy.185 In turn, intended recipients would find it 
difficult to obtain accurate information, as they would have to verify 
the accuracy of a firm's statements.186 
179 Id. at 387. 
180 Id. See also Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the 
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1953, 1958-59 (1996). 
181 Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy Intentional 
Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WrLLAMETTE L. REv. 233, 240-49 (2005). Plaintiffs in cases 
alleging fraud as to job security are less likely to be successful than those in other types of cases. 
182 Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1887, 1924 (2013). 
183 Id. 
184 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 751. 
185 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 674 (1984). 
186 David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1601, 1618-19 (1996). 
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In the employment and labor market, workers have less protection 
from private monitoring than in the capital market.187 As one 
commentator put it: "the dominant minority of informed traders is the 
community of market professionals, such as arbitrageurs, researchers, 
brokers and portfolio managers, who devote their careers to acquiring 
information and honing evaluative skills."188 The capital market 
provides significant incentives for private monitoring of fraud while 
the employment and labor market must depend on the government for 
protection.189 Thus, the government must incur an additional cost of 
supervision, as they must use additional resources and manpower to 
effectively monitor fraud. 
Additionally, labor is much less fluid than capital, and 
arbitrageurs cannot make their fortunes by uncovering employer 
misrepresentations.190 Unions could provide some sort of private 
monitoring, but with the increasing decline of unions, 191 they are not 
nearly as enough to provide the kind of effective private monitoring 
that is needed in the workplace. Thus, without effective private 
monitoring devices, the workplace stands to benefit from a federal 
fraud protection. 
Even if verification was possible, costs are not always absorbed by 
the party committing the fraudulent misrepresentations.192 An honest 
employer who wishes to show that its statements are truthful would 
have to add a warranty of verification, which could be costly.193 In turn, 
hiring would be more costly, employers would decrease hiring, and 
employees would have a more difficult time finding employment.194 
Alternatively, where verification is not possible, employees will lose 
confidence in the market and demand higher wages in return for the 
increased risk.195 
Many employees have access to inside information, but much 
of the information tends to be incomplete or unverified.196 And, the 
larger and more complex and diversified the firm, the less useful the 
187 RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 
571 (1984). 
1ss Id. 
189 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 781. 
190 Id. 
191 See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, WORLD LABOR REPORT 1993, at 34 tbl. 3.1 (1993) (showing 
union density in the United States at 15% in 1989 compared to 32% in Germany, 39% in the United 
Kingdom, 45% in Australia, and 81 % in Sweden). 
192 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 752. 
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infonnation.197 The reality is that most firms are large, complex, and 
diversified, and employees do not have the kind of access to internal 
information that would flag fraud. 198 
c. STATE COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW IS INSUFFICIENT 
A lie about a financial good in the capital market may give rise 
to securities fraud liability.199 At common law, a lie in a nonfinancial 
setting may give rise to common law fraud (or deceit). Both types of 
fraud are similar in that they require similar elements; however, the 
element of reliance on the misrepresentation is different for common 
law fraud than it is for securities fraud. Reliance on a misrepresentation 
for liability in common law deceit must be actual and justifiable; by 
contrast, liability in securities fraud may arise under presumed 
reliance according to the fraud-on-the-market theory, provided the 
misrepresentation is material. 200 
In the common law arena, reliance is an essential element of causation 
connecting the misrepresentation to the plaintiff's injury because the 
misrepresentation influences the plaintiff only if "the plaintiff relies on 
the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from acti[ng]."201 Reliance, 
however, is only one of the required elements of causation. Even if the 
plaintiff took an action that was injurious because she believed or relied 
on the defendant's statements, plaintiff's response may nevertheless 
be un-actionable. 202 This is because the plaintiff may not necessarily 
be justified in believing the statement if a reasonable plaintiff would 
know it was false, irrelevant, or insignificant.203 In this circumstance, 
plaintiff's actions and damages incurred would be her fault and the 
defendant will not be held liable for avoidable consequence injuries.204 
In modern federal securities laws, reliance loses much of its 
importance because of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance.205 The justification for this starts with the premise that capital 
investors have confidence in the integrity of the market price of securities 
and hence rely on the integrity of the market price: /1 an investor who 
buys or sells at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the 
197 Id. at 1923-24. 
198 Id. at 1924. 
199 See, e.g., Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2014). 
200 Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: the Tortured Transition of 
Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 671, 673-74 (1995). 
201 Id. at 712. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS§ 65, at 458 (5th ed. 1984). 
205 Georgakopoulos, supra note 200, at 713. 
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integrity of that price" and "most publicly available information is 
reflected in market price[ s ];" therefore, /1 an investor's reliance on 
any public material misrepresentations ... may be presumed for the 
purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action."206 
The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance is largely 
unavailable at common law. Nevertheless, a presumption should 
be equally applicable in the employment and labor market. Just 
like investors have confidence in the integrity of the market price of 
securities, an employee places much confidence in the integrity of her 
employer, confidence in the terms and conditions of her employment, 
and confidence that her employer will not make misrepresentations. 
The adoption of indirect reliance as an element under common 
law fraud is distinct because the causal connection and the injury to 
be remedied are different. 207 Plaintiffs in a state cause of action for 
fraud seek to undo the consequences of their reliance by rescinding the 
transaction with the other party into which the misrepresentation led 
them. 208 By contrast, plaintiffs in an action for securities fraud seek to 
recover the portion of the price they paid or did not receive due to the 
inflation or depression that the misrepresentation caused. 209 
Moreover, under common law fraud, parties whom the 
misrepresentation did not necessarily reach, either directly or indirectly, 
are unable to recover any overpayments they may have incurred due 
to the misrepresentation. 210 However, in federal securities laws, the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance permits recovery of 
overpayments made due to the misrepresentation even to those parties 
who ignore the misrepresentation. 211 
Although common law prohibits fraud and requires accurate 
disclosures, there is no general duty to disclose information. Only in 
those limited circumstances do courts require disclosure of known 
defects.212 Additionally, known disclosure mandates available in the 
206 Id. at 714; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1987). 
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employment and labor market are largely dependent on the type of 
sector and/or employer actions. 213 
According to a study of reported case law in all U.S. jurisdictions, 
in the hiring stage, defendants tend to prevail in fraud actions brought 
by plaintiff employees in various contexts.214 At least one commentator 
suggests that common law courts look with /1 antipathy" at fraud 
causes of actions brought by employees. 215 Moreover, obtaining proof 
for plaintiff employees in a claim for fraudulent misrepresentations 
is difficult, as the element of intent must be shown, which is further 
exacerbated due to the confusion of the "intent" requirement. 216 
It can be said that disclosure laws are often adopted because of 
troublesome events, including highly publicized disasters that may 
have been prevented if an adequate law was in place.217 In these cases, 
the public often demands that the government do something about it, 
often creating laws that are ill equipped to effectively deal with the 
issue at hand. This can lead to too many disclosures or not enough 
effective ones. However, the same can be said about regulation through 
the judicial process, 218 where judges also face pressures to act by highly 
publicized events but umepresentative trouble stories. 219 Also, common 
law imposes a range of high costs because of the existing variation 
of legal rules across jurisdictions, coupled with the uncertainty and 
elasticity of the legal rules within each jurisdiction. 220 
With regard to statutory protection against fraud, few states actually 
offer any in the workplace. 221 When contrasted to other industries, states 
213 See supra notes 115-129. 
214 Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy Intentional 
Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WrLLAMETTE L. REv. 233, 236 (2005). 
215 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 722. 
216 Frank J. Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the Employment Context: 
the Deceitful, Careless, and Thoughtless Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 86 ("one must be aware 
that the 'intent' issue can arise in a variety of fraud settings, to wit: the intent not to perform an 
agreement at the time the representation was made, which is evidence of 'promissory fraud"'); see 
id. (noting that the intent to induce reliance, that is, evidence that the defendant 'intended' that his 
or her representation induce the reliance on the part of the plaintiff; and intent as 'scienter,' that 
is, evidence of a knowingly, purposefully, fraudulent state of mind"). 
217 Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 377 (2013). 
21s Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 777. Notwithstanding the variance in legal rules to address fraud 
in the workplace, common law is inadequate to address the chief issue of disclosing information 
in the first place. 
221 Courts in Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and North Carolina have held that 
disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship are not covered by those states' unfair 
trade practices statutes. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW§ 4.02[5][f] (1996) 
(collecting cases). 
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offer an array of statutory protection. 222 Also, states may be hesitant in 
adopting state regulation until they obtain assurances that other states 
will go along with the enactments, 223 while other states may worry that 
adopting a statutory response will be costly due to employees moving 
to other states to take advantage of increased employee protection.224 
Another concern is that statutory and common law protections can 
overlap "to such an extent that the system does not function well."225 
Professor Summers found that a system of employment and labor 
law with "too many cumulative rights and remedies" would makes 
promises to employees, harass and drain the employer's assets, while 
enriching the lawyers and clogging the judicial court system. 226 
D. A DEFICIENT INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS LAW MODEL 
In the United States, workers are vulnerable to unrestrained 
discretion of their employers with regard to employment decisions. 227 
Protection is little compared to other industrialized countries. With 
few exceptions, the at-will doctrine prevails and employees are 
terminable at will for any reason. In turn, employers have discretion 
to monitor employees' computers, pay them low wages, 228 and provide 
few benefits.229 If employees do not like the treatment, they have no 
choice but to bear it, find employment elsewhere, or sue with unlikely 
favorable results.230 Employees can seek collective rights protection; 
however, the National Labor Relations Act231 and the collective rights 
and bargaining regime have been in steady decline, one commentator 
222 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. CH. 93A, § 2 (West 1997) ("Unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful"). See also supra notes 114-129. 
223 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 784. 
224 Id. 
225 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 275 (2002). 
226 Id. (citing Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. 
REv. 7, 18 (1988) ("[t]he most difficult problem of the near future will be reconciling overlapping 
protections")). 
227 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 261. 
228 So long as it does not go below the federal minimum wage as established under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 218 (2012), or under another applicable state or municipal 
minimum wage law. 
229 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 261. 
230 See supra note 131. 
231 Enacted in 1935 "to protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective 
bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm 
the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy." National Labor Relations Act, 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
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even stating that it is "the law of the past."232 Instead, it is individual 
employment laws that have been the growing model for workplace 
regulation. 233 
Nevertheless, today's employment laws are inadequate to protect 
employees in the workplace. A great concern is whether workplace 
regulation dominated by individual employment rights provides an 
adequate forum in which employees can effectively vindicate their 
rights in either state or federal court. 234 Indeed, commentators have 
stated that "[i]t would be hard ... to find anyone who believes that 
the nation has enough judges and courthouses to make common law 
litigation the modal institution of employee grievance processing."235 A 
parallel concern is "whether there are enough lawyers willing to take 
the cases."236 The truth is that litigation costs are high and because of 
this reality, /1 all but middle and upper income employees are largely 
foreclosed from any access to a remedy for wrongful dismissal" and 
"[l]ower income employees without substantial tort claims will have 
difficulty finding a lawyer."237 Employees could take advantage 
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms but in the end, what 
employees need is an efficient and effective forum to adjudicate their 
employment rights. 238 
An employee who seeks redress against fraudulent 
misrepresentations made by her employer would have to navigate 
through the costly, risky, and lengthy court process, not knowing when 
she will be vindicated. And, unless they have the income, employees 
with insubstantial tort claims will be left out. 
Another concern with the individual employment rights system is 
the "minimal terms" that employment and labor law provides. Many 
of the rights specified in current statutes are often not what employees 
232 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 272 (2002). 
233 Id. (citing James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. 
REv. 1563, 1571 (1996) ("At some point during this legislative barrage, it became clear that Congress 
viewed government regulation founded on individual employment rights, rather than collective 
bargaining between private entities, as the primary mechanism for ordering employment relations 
and redistributing economic resources")). 
234 See supra note 131. 
235 Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 
Cm.-KENT L. REv. 149, 154 (1993). 
236 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 274. 
237 Id. (citing Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and 
Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1992)). 
238 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKLEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 259, 274-75 (2002). 
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need. "Employees often know better than Washington Bureaucrats how 
to improve their workplace;" indeed, the limitations of employment 
statutes are the result of their specification of minimum rights. 239 For 
instance, under OSHA, employers must disclose or provide access to 
all its employees Material Safety Data Sheets, which contain important 
information about health hazards associated with chemicals in the 
workplace.240 While this is an important right for employees to assert, 
many employees may prefer to have available other more relevant 
information. 
A final concern is that research indicates that an increasing 
number of employees in the United States are filing fraud actions to 
remedy employer misrepresentations.241 "Fraud claims are particularly 
problematic for employee plaintiffs because of the disfavored nature 
of the fraud action and the difficult proof issues associated with the 
claim."242 
VII. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A FEDERAL STATUTORY RESPONSE IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MARKET 
Implementing a general disclosure mandate in the workplace 
will undoubtedly be costly, and because it involves enforcement and 
monitoring from a public body, it also includes costs on society as a 
whole. 243 However, the relevant question is whether the costs would 
outweigh the benefits in the employment and labor market. 
To the extent fraud is concerned, one objection that can be 
made to the requirement of a federal statute is that the concept of 
"materiality" will be extremely difficult to prove as it must be done 
on a case-by-case basis, and thus an employer will have to incur high 
costs to make sure that anything it communicates with its employees 
is not against the law.244 Furthermore, because employers engage in 
employee communications at all times of the working day, formally 
and informally, monitoring may be more difficult.245 However, what is 
considered "material" in the workplace would entail only a subset of 
239 Id. at 276 (citing Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. 
& PuB. POL'Y 489, 493 (2001). 
240 See supra note 119. 
241 Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy Intentional 
Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WrLLAMETTE L. REv. 233, 237 (2005). 
242 Id. at 588. 
243 Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 
VA. L. REv. 723, 733-34, nn. 31-34 (discussing the social costs of truth-telling). 
244 Greenfield, supra note 53, at 777. In this context, "materiality" refers to the weight of a given 
misrepresentation. Thus, for a misrepresentation to be fraudulent, it must be "material." 
245 Id. 
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all employee communication.246 If compared to other markets, the cost 
is much lower.247 
A federal statute can provide many benefits in the employment 
and labor market. Forcing firms to compile information about their 
activities will incentivize "self-reflection" through firm fact-finding. In 
turn, management will educate itself on matters deemed important to 
the employer. 248 Specifically, if employers fear that disclosing certain 
information will affect their image or reputation, this will serve as 
fuel to encourage management and corporate representatives to take 
a more vested interest in the affairs of their company.249 What results 
is a form of internal discipline, as management will be more critical of 
the information that is conveyed up and down the employer pipeline 
by ensuring that relevant information is collected and conveyed to 
responsible executives and corporate officials. 250 
Information disclosure regulation can have the effect of empowering 
private parties to act as monitors of employer conduct, an almost 
absent phenomenon in the employment and labor market. By so doing, 
whatever costs may initially be accrued by a government mandate will 
be offset by the engagement of private parties, including employees, 
consumers, and others who will use the information disclosed to 
pressure firms to adjust their behavior in a manner desired by the 
regulation or by the state.251 Access to information about employer 
conduct may expose vulnerabilities and help in altering the unequal 
bargaining power that exists between employers and employees 
today. 252 
From a democratic perspective, information is "valuable to [a] 
vibrant democracy no matter what specific theory of democracy 
one endorses."253 For instance, pluralist forms of democracy rely on 
majoritarian decisionmaking, which are constrained by individual 
rights. In such context, information is necessary to assist individuals 
246 Id. 
247 Id. In the capital market, there is a broad range of required disclosures that must be made to 
companies, potential investors, and the general public, which encompasses a much broader reach 
than would be necessary in the employment and labor market. Id. 
248 David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through Reflexive Domestic 
Disclosure Regnlation, 43 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 374-75 (2005). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 375. 
251 Id. 
252 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Atkins and Beyond, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 613, 618-19 (1999). 
253 William M. Sage, Regnlating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1802-03 (1999); see also CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY 1-3 (1976). 
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defend their fundamental rights against majority force. 254 Information 
helps the public monitor the /1 apparatus" of the government and the 
private sector, which in turn allows citizens to form and value beliefs 
and choices, enabling deliberative and healthy debate.255 
VIII. A PROPOSED OUTLINE 
If the arguments above have been convincing, this section will 
provide an outline of what a federal statute might look like, with 
components of mandated disclosure and liability against fraud, 
taking into account factors of scope, cost effectiveness, administrative 
regulatory support, and liabilities, sanctions, and enforcement. 
A. CONTOURS AND SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE AND FRAUD PROTECTION 
Disclosure is about transparency, and transparency is about 
availability, accessibility, and accountability.256 These are the goals that 
a proper disclosure mandate should seek to achieve. Disclosure will 
facilitate knowledge, but its effectiveness to do so will depend on many 
factors, including the degree of disclosure. 257 
To construct an effective federal statute, three degrees of disclosure 
must be reflected upon. Firstly, Congress must determine who 
possesses the pertinent information or documents.258 In this case, firms 
possess the relevant information, which employees seek to obtain. 
Thus, the disclosing parties would include employers that employ a 
large enough number of employees.259 Secondly, Congress would need 
to determine which records, proceedings, or data would need to be 
disclosed by firms and which would not.260 Information could include 
management discussions and analysis of the financial condition and 
results of operation.261 Information could relate to the company's 
financial condition in an easy to read format, changes in financial 
condition, and results of operations relating to liquidity and capital 
254 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1802-03. 
2ss Id. 
256 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1346 (2011). 
257 Id. at 1345. 
2ss Id. 
259 This paper does not go into what is considered a large enough number of employees. For 
simplicity purposes, this paper will follow the same quota as that of the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, which applies to employers who have 100 or more full-time 
employees; see generally, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) 
(2012). 
260 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1345. 
261 Such disclosure is currently available under federal securities laws. See supra note 117. 
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resources.262 Thirdly, the size and identity of the permitted audience 
who will ultimately have access to the information should be taken 
into account. 263 In this federal proposal, the audience could include 
employees as well as prospective employees who need information 
about a prospective employer. It is important to note that allowing 
access to any party would not be feasible; thus, only persons who could 
actually benefit would have access.264 
With regard to fraud protection, SEC Rule lOb-5 provides a model 
outline of what a regulation may look like in the employment and labor 
market. The rule lays out the following elements: it shall be unlawful 
for any employer engaged in interstate commerce, 11 [t]o employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 11 [t]o make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made" not misleading; or /1 to engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security."265 
B. CosT REDUCTION AND ANTICIPATING UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Costs should be modest if the disclosure regime focuses on 
information that employers are /1 already producing, either for 
purposes of compliance with existing legal regimes or for distribution 
to current employees."266 This may include federal statutes pertaining 
to workplace injuries, involuntary dismissals, and health hazards in the 
workplace. However, much of this information is rarely made public. 267 
A good place to start could be to piggyback on the existing reporting 
requirements and to make those disclosures available to a wider 
population base, including employees and prospective employees. 
Employers would bear no additional cost of organizing this information 
in a standardize readable format; if there was a cost, it would be the 
cost to publicly disclose the information on the internet, which would 
be minor.268 It might even be possible for the government to bear some 
cost in making the public disclosures. Regulatory officials will already 
have done much of the work in defining the form and content of the 
262 See supra note 117. 
263 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1345. 
264 Id. at 1345-46. 
265 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOB-5 (2014). 
266 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 396 
(2011). 
267 See supra note 129. 
268 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 396. 
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information that is useful for regulators; hence, some of the burden of 
the required disclosure mandate could be shifted to the government. 269 
Another way that employers can reduce costs could be to post 
online. Employers already generate information regarding terms 
and conditions of employment for their own purposes, including 
for distribution to employees. 270 Under a public disclosure mandate, 
employers could be required to post relevant information on the 
internet where only the intended audience can access the information, 
and the employer can update the disclosures whenever there is new 
information to be distributed.271 The actual administrative cost of 
posting existing company documents on existing company websites is 
likely to be small. 
Targeted disclosures can help save employer resources in both 
the short-term and long-term future by focusing on providing only 
relevant information instead of simply "dumping" information to the 
prospective audience receivers. One of the most important regulatory 
developments has been the focus on targeted transparency. 272 More 
information is not necessarily the better alternative to no information. 273 
However, what is needed are disclosures that are more simplified 
and "targeted" that allow people to make the right decisions. 274 One 
good example is Executive Order 13,563, a key executive directive of 
targeted transparency by the Obama Administration, which mandates 
a retrospective review of existing regulations and encourages a 
"provision of information to the public in a form that is clear and 
intelligible."275 Thus, as Administrator of the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Cass Sunstein put it: /1 agencies should 
nonetheless take steps to eliminate undue complexity and should 
attempt, where appropriate and consistent with law, to simplify and 
ease people's decisions. " 276 
To reach this form of disclosure, information technology and 
intermediaries can be used to standardize complex information into 
269 Id. at 396-97. 
270 Id. at 397. 
271 Id. at 397-98. 




275 Id. at 579-80; see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3822 § 4 (January 21, 2011). 
276 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: DISCLOSURE AND SIMPLIFICATION AS REGULATORY TOOLS 2 
(June 18, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg! 
disclosure_principles.pdf. 
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"machine readable formats to enable consumers to make informed 
decisions."277 For instance, the SEC promulgated a rule requiring 
applicable entities to provide standardized, machine-readable risk-
return summary disclosures for mutual funds. 278 Another instance 
are motor-vehicle letter grading for fuel economy and greenhouse 
gas emissions proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 279 
c. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY SUPPORT, LIABILITIES, 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
Assuming that a federal mandate is enacted, Congress could take 
extra measures by providing congressional delegation of power to 
an executive administrative agency in order to carry out the enacted 
legislation. An executive branch agency would be tasked with 
promulgating rules pursuant to an informal or formal notice and 
comment process to encourage parties to participate in the rulemaking 
process and provide their wide expertise, as it can be predicted that there 
will be an array of participants across a wide spectrum of industries. 
Enabling an executive agency to engage in rulemaking could aid 
in filling any gaps in federal law and create a more democratic process 
by allowing participants to engage in the rulemaking process. It would 
allow participants to input their expertise to improve federal regulation. 
Rulings and orders made through agency adjudicatory proceedings 
such as the NLRB is not mentioned because promulgating rules, 
unlike orders, applies in an across the board basis and are prospective 
in nature. Adjudicatory proceedings would potentially work against 
judicial expediency by having to go through an adjudicatory process 
and proceed on a case-by-case basis, expending resources on litigation. 
The enforcement scheme should be crafted in a way to ensure that 
enforcement of the disclosure mandate does not overburden a disclosing 
entity. 28° Firstly, with respect to compliance-related information, 
277 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: INFORMING CONSUMERS THROUGH SMART DISCLOSURE 
12 (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-
agencies/informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf. 
278 Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, for the Heads 
of Exec. Dep' ts & Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 2. 
279 See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,078, 58,082 
(Sept. 23, 2010) (proposing letter grading); 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,488-89 (July 6, 2011) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600, 49 C.F.R. pt. 575) (choosing alternative label); FuEL ECONOMY 
LABEL: EXPERT PANEL REPORT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/label/420r10908.pdf (making design recommendations for 
letter-grade labels). 
280 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REv. 351, 400-01 
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penalties for failure to accurately disclose required information could 
be part of the federal statutory remedy in an enforcement action 
brought by a plaintiff employee (or prospective employee).281 Secondly, 
with respect to agreements demanded by employers as a condition of 
employment and that bind employees (e.g. arbitration agreements), 
11 advance public disclosure" could be a condition of the agreement's 
enforceability. 282 The cause of action should require, as any other law 
should, that the complaint for fraud be done with /1 certainty, clarity, 
specificity, particularity, and objectivity."283 
IX. CONCLUSION 
VIII outlines a recommended federal statute of disclosure and fraud 
protection by addressing its possible contours and scope, methods to 
reduce costs and anticipate unintended consequences, the possibility of 
an executive administrative agency to promulgate rules to aid in further 
interpreting the proposed federal statute, as well as possible liabilities 
and enforcement schemes that could be used. Part IX concludes with 
the proposition that a federal law is both possible and necessary. 
This paper has argued that a disclosure mandate cannot exist 
without the availability of fraud protection because the former would 
be meaningless without the latter. Furthermore, the status quo in the 
employment and labor market is insufficient. For instance, common 
law is inadequate to deal with issues of disclosure and fraud, just as 
Congress so argued when it was concerned with its deficiencies in the 
capital market. 
The importance of a disclosure mandate coupled with fraud 
protection in the employment and labor market cannot be overstated. 
When comparing the costs to its benefits, this paper concludes that a 
federal statutory response could work in the employment and labor 
market. Without a uniform disclosure requirement, much of this 
information will be difficult to obtain. Information that is voluntarily 
disclosed may not have the security of verifiability that is needed. 
Market-self correction is unable to effectively monitor and regulate 
the gaps in the workplace. And, the overlapping issues in the current 
individual employment rights law model would prove ineffective in 
providing the kind of protection that employees need in the workplace. 
(2011). 
281 Id. at 401. 
282 Id. 
283 See Advent Elecs. Inc. v. Buckman, 918 F. Supp. 260, 264-65 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[A] claimant must 
be able to point to specific, objective manifestations of fraudulent intent-a scheme or device. If he 
cannot, it is in effect presumed that he cannot prove facts at trial entitling him to relief"). 
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Adopting a federal statute is no easy task. Indeed, many issues 
must be addressed. As some commentators have stated: for mandated 
disclosure and fraud protection to work, lawmakers must succeed 
not only at identifying the problem that needs a regulatory response, 
but they must also correctly decide that mandated disclosure coupled 
with fraud protection is the appropriate regulatory solution and they 
must comprehensively articulate the standard.284 In the end, however, 
employeesmustbegivenanopportunitytoobtainnecessaryinformation 
that will enable them to make intelligent decisions about their current 
and future wellbeing, the same way that capital investors have the 
opportunity to do. And, employees must be given an opportunity to 
hold those liable for misrepresenting information, the same way that 
capital investors are able to do. 
284 Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 378 (2013). 
